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Does foreign  direct investment  (FDI) increase  national  saving in the five Pacific  Basin
domestic  investment,  or does it provide  developing  market  economies  implies that FDI
additional  foreign  exchange for a pre-existing  could  have more  of a negative  effect on the
current  account deficit,  or some linear  current account  than through  increased  domestic
combination  of the two? Fry investigates  this  investment  alone.
question  for a group of five Pacific  Basin
countries  and a control  group of 11 other  Fry also investigates  the impact  of FDI on
developing  countries.  economic  growth in these 16 countries,  taking
into account  distortions  in the economies.  He
For th%  sample  of all 16 developing  estimates  reduced-fonn  current account
countries,  Fry finds  that FD; does not provide  equations,  and presents  an analytical  framework
additional  balance  of payments  financing  for a  for estimating  FDI's effect on economic  growth
pre-existing  current account  deficit.  In the  in the presence  of incentive-disincentive
control group of II developing  countries,  FDI is  packages  and other economic  distortions.
associated  with reduced  domestic  investment  -
implying  that FDI to those countries  is simply a  He illustrates  his framework  using i-ndicators
close substitute  for other capital  inflows.  For the  of foreign  trade and financial  distortions.  His
five Pacific Basin market  economies,  however,  main conclusion:  the effect of FDI differs
FDI raises domestic  investment  by the full extent  markedly from  one group of countries  to another.
of the FDI inflow.
FPDI  has a negative  effect on economic
Fry finds that FDI has a significantly  growth in the control  group. It has the same
negative  impact  on national  saving in the sample  positive  effect on growth  as domestically
of all 16  developing  countries.  For the control  financed  investment  does in the Pacific Basin
group, this negative  effect is similar  in  countries.  The main cause for the different  effect
magnitude  to FDI's negative  effect on domestic  is the low level of distortion  in the Pacific Basin
investmnent  - implying  a zero  effect on the  countnes.
current account.  But FDI's negative  effect on
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1  Introduction
Over the past  decade, many developing countries have taken a fresh look at  their policies
towards foreign direct investment. Since 1982,  foreign capital inflows  to developing  countries
have declined and  world real interest  rates have increased.  It  is against this  background
that  foreign direct investment  (FDI)  has been viewed by some as a panacea for declining
domestic investment and higher costs of borrowing abroad. The empirical evidence provides
no support for such euphoria.
The vast literature on foreign direct investment (FDI)  falls roughly into four categories:
(a)  macroeconomic studies of the determinants of aggregate FDI flows, some of which use
measures of various government incentives or disincentives as well as the degree of protec-
tion/distortion  in the domestic economy  as explanatory variables; (b) macroeconomic  analysis
of the effects of FDI and other capital inflows  on the rate of economic  growth, invariably  igno--
ing the extent of government incentive/disincentives packages (hereafter referred to simply
as packages) and the extent of other distortions in the economy; (c) microeconomic  studies
of the effects of FD!  in specific industries which generally ignore packages but may examine
the productivity or efficiency  of FDI compared to dormestically  financed investment; (d) de-
scriptive studies in which long lists of government incentives and disincentives are compiled
and discussed. 1
Virtually  all the empirical investigations into the causes and consequences of rDI use
single-equation models. 2 Here, I examine the effects  of FDI in a four-equation macroeconomic
model containing investment, saving, growth and  current account equations.  I apply this
framework to  a sample of 16 developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,  Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey, and Venezuela). The results provide some new information on the direct and indirect
effects of FDI inflows  to this sample of developing countries.
In undertaking any analysis of FDI, one must recognize that  FDI data  record financial
flows which may or may not  correspond to changes in capital formation.  Whether or not
they do depends on the extent  of substitutability  of this  type of financial flow for other
types of financial flows. In some of the literature,  the view prevails that  FDI can serve two
'Guisinger  (1986) may hold the  record with a list of 64 types of government incentives and disincentives
affecting FDI. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1989, pp. 21-25) also lists and
classifies numerous incentives and disincentives to FDI.
2The exceptions include the simultaneous two-equation models used by Lee, Rana, and Iwasaki (1986) and
Husain and Jun (1992).2
purposes, namely, raise investment and relieve  foreign  exchange shortages. 3 Unless FDI affects
national saving, however, it can raise domestic investment or provide additional financing
for a pre-existing current account deficit or achieve some combination of the two, but the
linear combinat5on  of these two effects must always sum to one.  Hence, section 3 addresses
the question of whether  FDI  to  the 16 developing countries increases domestic investment
or provides additional foreign exchange for balance-of-payments support.  Section 4 then
examines the possibility that  FDI ccould  affect national saving both  directly and indirectly
through  the rate of economic growth; this section also presents estimates of reduced-form
current account equations.
Foreign direct investment appears attractive  because it involves a risk-sharing relation-
ship with investors from the home country. Such risk-sharing does not exist in the formal
contractual  arrangements for foreign loans.  Foreign direct investment appears particularly
attractive  when existing stocks are low. Low stocks of foreign-owned  capital imply low flows
of repatriated profits. Over time, however,  success in attracting FDI will  increase this counter-
flow, which could exceed the alternative flow of interest payments in the longer run.  Clearly,
therefore, the question of the cost of FDI to reduce risk must be addressed in any evaluation
of the benefits to be derived from substituting FDI for foreign borrowing. The benefits to the
host country will depend on both the size of the package and the extent of other distortions
in the economy. Hence, section 5 sketches an analytical framework for estimating the effect
of FDI on economic growth for given incentive-disincentive  packages and other distortions
in the economy. To illustrate  this analysis, I use indicators of foreign trade and financial
distortions.
2  Global  Trends  and  Foreign  Direct  Investment  Flows
to  Pacific  Basin  Developing  Market  Economies
Foreign capital inflows to  developing countries constitute part of the world's saving.  Over
the past two decades, world saving as a proportion of world income has fallen. A comparison
of the  periods 1968-1981 and  1982-1988  illustrates this worldwide decline in saving ratios
(Aghevli et al. 1990, pp. 9 and 36-37): saving in developed countries has fallen from 25 to 20
per cent of GNP and developing country saving has fallen from 25 to 22 per cent of GNP.  One
3For example, Cockcroft  and Riddell (1991, p. 3)  note:  'Two of the principal  factors inhibiting higher
levels of economic  growth in Sub-Saharan  Africa  in the 1990s  are  low levels of investment  and foreign  exchange
shortages. The first attraction of foreign  investment  lies in its potential to address both these constraints.'3
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Figure 1: World Saving and Investment, 1970-1991.
important  reason for the worldwide decline in saving is rising government deficits: up from
2.9 per cent in the period 1972-1980 to 4.5 per cent in the period 1981-1988  (International
Financial Statistics:  1988 and 1991 Yearbooks,  p. 156).
The decline in  world saving implies that  not  every country  can maintain its level of
domestic investment by increasing foreign capital inflows. Overall, the decline in saving has
to be matched by an equal decline;  investment. In fact, saving and investment ratios have
fallen in all geographical regionis  of the world since 1982, but least in developing countries of
Asia and the Pacific.  As world saving has shrunk, so the world real interest rate has risen
from 1.5 per cent during the period 1970-1980 to 4.8 per cent in the period 1981-1991, as
iUustrated in Figure 1.  With no signs of a reversal in the declining trend in global saving
and the immediate saving-ieducing  impacts of the war in the Gulf, reunification of Germany,
reconstruction of Eastern  Europe, and deliberate current  account-reduction policies being
implemented by Japan,  Korea, and Taiwan, the costs of foreign borrowing can be expected
to rise stiU higher in the 1990s  as the saving curve in Figure 1 moves even further to the left.
The decline in foreign capital inflows to developing countries has necessitated structural
adjustmnent  in  the form of an  increase in export earnings or a  reduction in import expen-
diture.  The national accounting identities imply that  the adjustment has to raise national4
saving or reduce  domestic  investment.  To maintain  or increase  rates  of economic growth,  the
adjustment  must  be in the  form of increased  exports  and  increased  national  saving.  Import
compression  and  reduced  domestic  investment  inevitably  lower growth  rates.  However, as
Riccardo  Faini and  Jaime  de Melo (1990, p. 492) note:  " ...  with  the signrficant exception  of
East  Asian countries,  adjustment  was achieved by cutting  investment  rather  than  increasing
saving."  The inevitable  effect has been sharp  reductions  in rates  of growth in all parts  of the
developing  world, again  with  the  exception  of Asia and  the  Pacific.
It  is against  this  background  that  FDI  has appeared  increasingly  attractive  to  developing
countries  facing  declining  domestic  investment  and  higher costs  of foreign borrowing.  Glob-
ally,  FDI  has  increased  dramatically  over  the  past  decade.  However, most  of this  increase
has  occurred  in  the  industrial  countries.  In  the  developing  countries,  FDI  has  been  heavily
concentrated  among  a  small  number  of countries.  Indead,  Table  1 shows  that  over 90  per
cent of FDI inflows to developing  countries  in 1990 was received by only  18 countries.  Half of
this  total  flowed to eight  Pacific Basin developing market  economies  (Hong Kong, Indonesia,
.Korea, Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and  Thailand).  Given  that  neither  Korea
nor  'Taiwan has  shown strong  interest  in attracting  FDI,  it  may  seem  surprising  that  these
economies  feature  in  Table  1.  The explanation  lies in  their  superlative  investment  climates
(Fry  1991).
Although  the  Pacific  Basin developing  market  economies  all  pursue  export-oriented  de-
velopment  policies,  their  policies towards  capital  -count  liberalization  differ substantially.
Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  and  Malaysia  have open  capital  accounts,  while Korea  and  Taiwan
have  liberalized  slowly and  reluctantly.  Nevertheless,  Hal  Hill (1990, p. 24)  detects  a  com-
mon  trend:  "A key feature  of East  Asia has  been  an increasingly  open and  receptive  policy
environment  during  the  1980s for a  variety  of reasons:  the  need  to  recycle  trade  surpluses
(in  Korea  and  Taiwan);  greater  confidence in  the  completitive  capacities  of domestic  busi-
ness  groups  (these  two states  plus Thailand);  economnic  imperatives,  such as a deteriorating
current  account  for  all  or part  of the  decade  (Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines);  and  a
perception  that  FDI  may  be preferable  to local non-indigenous  investment  (as  in Malaysia)."
Less liberal  capital  account  policies in Korea  and  Taiwan  appear  not  to have  been costly
in terms of foreg-ine growth.  Indeed,  Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Yung Chul Park (1987, pp. 432-
433) conclude:
The overriding characteristic of private capital flows, without much exaggeration, is that
capital tends to come when it is unnecessary and leave when it is least convenient. As a
result it tends to increase the variability of real exchange rates and introduces avoidable5
Table 1: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1990.
Country  $ millions
Industrial Countriac  151,970





















Source: United Nations, World  Investment  Report  1992: Transnational  Corporations  as Engines  of Growth
(New York: United Nations,  1992),  Annex  Table 1, pp. 312-316.
macroeconomic instability. One cannot escape the iih.pression  that  Korea, under the im-
pact of abundant external capital, might lose its competitive exchange rate, overborrow,
and ultimately become  once again a problem debtor.  Korea's investment rate is more than
30 percent of GNP.  There is little to suggest that  capital imports are necessary because
capital is in short supply.
The question which I now address is whether FDI flows  to developing countries have increased6
capital fo,mation, or provided additional balance-of-payments  financing, or neither.
3  Does  Foreign  Direct  Investment  Pren'.ide  More  Balance-
of-Payments  Financing  or  Increase  Capital  Formation?
3.1  A  Test  for  Additional  Financing
As the global supply of capital has dwindlcd, FDi  has been seen by some as a potent-al addi-
tional source of finance for the balance of payments. Using James Meade's (1951) distinction
between autonomous and accommodating capital flows,  Philip Turner (1991, pp. 91-95) ad-
dresses the question of whether or not net Fol flows  are accommodating and hence constitute
additional balance-of-payments  financing by regressing components of the capital account on
the current account financing requirement (both in first differences)  for some OECD  countries.
The estimated equation takes the form:
AKFi  = ao + a, AIJFR,  (1)
where AKFi is the year-on-year change in the net capital flow  item expressed as a percentage
of GNP  and AKFR is the year-on-year change in the current account minus the official  settle-
ments balance also expressed as a percentage of GNP  (both in current prices). Turner (1991,
Table 33, p. 92) finds that  short-term bank flows  are significantly  correlated with the current
account financing requirement with coefficients  ranging from 0.27 (United Kingdom) to 0.88
(Canada)  for seven of the 10 OECD  countries. In the case "t  FDI, however, Turner concludes
that this flow is much closer to being autonomous than accommodating; the coefficient  is sig-
nificant only in the case of France with a value of only 0.13. Turner ranks long-term banking
lending as the most autonomous, FDI next, portfolio investmncat  third, and short-term bank
loans as the most accommodative type of capital flow; Turner's results are reproduced here
in Table 2. Only coefficients  with t statistics of 1.5 and over are reported.
Using Tufne:'s  methodology with data on net capital flows  from International Financial
Statistics  CD-ROM  for a sample of 16 developing countries, 4 I find a rather different response
pattern,  as shown in Table 3. In contrast to the OECD countries, other long-term capital flows
appear to be just as sensitive to current account financing requirements as short-term flowF  in
this sample of developing countries. For these countries, therefore, one might rank portfolio
41 drop Bermuda,  China,  Colombia, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Taiwan  from  the developing
countries listed in Tabie 1 on thie basis of their small size or data deficiencies, but add Indi.-,  Pakistan,  and
Sri Lanka.7
Table 2: Sensitivity of Individual Capital Account Net InflowC  to Current Account Financing
Requirements in OE;CD  Countries, 1975-1989.
Direct  Portfolio  Long-term  Short-term  Public
Country  investment  investment  flows  flows  sector
United States  0.55
(2.8)




Canada  0.11  0.88
(1.6)  (3.1)
France  0.13  0.32
(2.7)  (1.6)
Italy  U.38  0.23
(2.7)  (2.2)
United Kingdom  -0.10  0.27  0.25








Note: t statistics  in parentheses.
Source:  Turner,  Capital Flows in  the  1980s:  A  Survey  of Major  Trends (Basel:  Bank  for International
Settlements,  Monetary and  Economic Department, BIS Economic Papers No. 30, 1991), Table 33, p. 92.
investment as the most autonomous,  FDI or capital inflows to the public sector next, and
both long- and short-term  bank loans as the most accommodative type of capital flow. All
but one of the reported coefficients  for FDI are less than 0.1; in Malaysia's case the coefficient
is 0.14. On the basis of this  table,  therefore,  FDI appears to be autonomous. 5 The negative
coefficients of  FDI in India,  Korea,  and  the  United  Kingdom  may  reflect the deterrent  effect
of increasing current account deficits on FDI inflows, since large current  account  deficits can
5For the  five Pacific Basin developing market economies, short-term  bank  loans seem slightly more ac-
commodativ,; than  long-term loans, but the general pattern  is similar to the pattern  in the top part of the
table.8
Table 3: Sensitivity of Indi,; 'ual Capital Account Net Inflows  to Current Account Financing
Requirement in 16 Developing  Countrie3.
Direct  Portfolio  Long-term  Short-term  Public





Cb;j_e  0.60**  0.X6*
(1975-1991)  (2.0)  (3.5)
Egypt
(1975-1988)
India  -0.O0*  0.35**  0.39**
(1975-1989)  (-2.9)  (2.0)  (2.1)
Mexico  O.07**  0.41*  0.67*





Sri Lanka  0.21**
(1975-1991)  (2.0)
Turkey  -0.09*  0.50*
(1975-1990)  (-2.1)  (2.9)
Venezuela  0.62*  0.58*
(1975-1991)  (2.5)  (2.5)
Indonesia  0.07*  0.05*
(1975-1990)  (2.2)  (3.3)
Korea  -0.02**  0.32**  0.39**
(1975-1990)  (-2.0)  (1.8)  (2.1)
Malaysia  0.14*  0.26**





Note: t statistics  in parentheses.  '  95 per cent confidence level.  *  90 per cent confidence level.9
worsen a country's investment climate. This would also support the view that  FDI inflows  are
largely unrelated to balance-of-payments financing,  requirements.  However, it does stlggest
that  FDI should be treated as endogenous to a country's saving-iinvestment  process.
Unfortunately, Turner's technique is seriously flawed. First, with enough substitutability
between alternative forms of capital inflows, there may be no bivariate correlation between
any of the components and the overall current account financing requ.rement.  Indeed, tliis
is the case for Egypt, Nigeria, and  the Philippines in Table 3.  Out of 80 regressions, only
12 yield significant coefficients at  the 95 per cent confidence level.  Second, the bivariate
regressions fail to establish causality. 6
A country's current account deficit is financed by foreign saving. Just as national saving
flows through several channels before reaching the investor, so too does foreign saving. One
channel through  which foreign saving flows is FDI.  As Michael Dooley (1990) points out,
foreign direct investment constitutes  a flow-of-funds  concept and records a  financial flow.
Financial flows  from saving to investment can take many forms, some of which are virtually
perfect substitutes.  For example, debt flows  can become  equity flows  when tax reforms change
incentives without affecting capital formation in any way.  In the same way, foreign debt
flows  can bect ne FDI flows  without causing any change in capital formation. Because of the
high degree of substitutability  and fungibility in such financial flows,  flow-of-funds  data are
seldom useful for economic  analysis (Dooley 1990,  p. 75). In other words, it may be difficult,
if not  impossible, to determine whether FDI is autonomous or accommodating, whether it
increases capital formation or provides additional balance-of-payments  financing, or whether
it  provides neither  because an  increase in FDI simply offsets a  reduction in another  type
of capital flow. The evidence presented so far suggests that  FDI does not provide additional
balance-of-payments  financing. Therefore, I now turn to the question of whether FDI increases
capital formation or simply substitutes for other types of international capital flows.
3.2  A Test  for Additional  Investment
Whether or not substitutability  and fungibility are so high that  FDI flows  provide no relevant
economic information at all is an empirical question. The estimates of the current account
financing requirement equation suggests that  FDI is either a close substitute for at least one
other type of capital flow or is indeed autonomous. In an attempt  to discriminate between
'While  I now address the first problem, the second is beyond the scope of the present paper but clearly
high on any agenda for future research  into this question. Indeed, a useful extension would be to conduct
causality tests using vector  autoregression  techniques.10
these two possibilities, I now investigate whether or not FDI affects the ratio of gross domestic
investment to  GNP.  To do this,  I use FDI as an explanatory variable rather  than  as the
dependent variable. Since causation could run both ways and  FDI could well oe determined
simultaneodsly with saving and investment, I also treat it as an endogenous variable.
The investment function IY specified here as the ratio of investment to GN P is based on the
flexible  accelerator model. Mario Blejer and Mohsin Khan (1984, pp. 382-383) describe some
of the difficulties of estimating neoclassical investment functions for developing countries.
Without  data on the capital stock and the return to capital, there is little choice in practice
but  to use some version of the accelerator rnodel.
The accelerator model has the desired capital stock K'  proportional to real output  y:
K'  = oy.  (2)
This can be expressed in terms of a desired ratio of investment to output  (I/Y)*:
(I/Y)*  =  07,  (3)
where -y  is the rate of growth in output denoted YG in the regression equation.
The partial adjustment  mechanism specified for the investment ratio is somewhat more
complicated than  the equivalent mechanism for the level of investment.  Specifically,  there
could be a lag in achieving the same investment ratio this year as last year if output  rose
rapidly last year; this year's desired investment level will be higher than last year's, despite
a constant desired ratio of investment to output.  To incorporate this adjustment lag, last
year's growth rate  yt-I  can be included as an explanatory variable. In this case, however,
the coefficient of yt-i was insignificant; hence, yt-i is omitted from the estimate.
The remaining adjustment  mechanism allows the actual investment rate  to adjust par-
tially in any one period to the difference  between the desired investment rate and the invest-
ment rate in the previous period:
A(I/Y)  =  \[(I/Y)*  - (I/Y)t-gu  (4)
or
I/Y  =  \(I/Y)'  + (1 - A)(I/Y)t. 1 ,  (5)
where A is the coefficient of adjustment.
The flexible accelerator model allows economic conditions to influence the adjustment
coefficient A. Specifically,
A =  =  +  [lZIl+  Z2  2+#z 3 Z  3  * *  (6)11
where zi are the variables (including an intercept term for the depreciation rate)  that affect
A.
A simple specification search suggests that,  for the  16 developing countries analyzed
here, the speed of adjustment is determined by the ratio of net  FDI inflows to GNP  FDIY,
the lagged real exchange rate index expressed in natural  logarithms REXLt_1,7' the lagged
cumulated net foreign liabilities converted into domestic currency and divided by lagged GNP
FLYt-1, and credit availability as measured by the change in domestic credit divided by GNP
DDCY.  Effective  domestic costs of borrowing  are extraordinarily difficult  to measure in almost
all developing countries because of selective credit policies and disequilibrium institutional
interest rates; hence the quantity rather than the price of credit is used here.
The price of intermediate imports may affect the profitability of investment projects in
these developing countries.  Hence, the real exchange rate expressed in natural  logarithms
REXL is included as a proxy for the price of nontradable goods in relation to import prices.
I measure the real exchange rate  REX  as:  (domestic GNP deflator/U.S. wholesale price in-
dex)/domestic  currency per U.S. dollar.  Therefore, a higher value of REXL implies a lower
relative price of imports. By appreciating the real exchange rate, capital inflows  may stimu-
late investment. On the other hand, an appreciation in the real exchange rate prices exports
out of world markets and may worsen  the investment climate. Hence, its affect on investment
is ambiguous.
The availability of institutional credit can be an important determinant of the investment
ratio, for the reasons discussed by Alan Blinder and Joseph Stiglitz (1983), Fry (1980) and
Peter Keller (1980). Banks specialize in acquiring information on default risk. Such informa-
tion is highly specific to each client and difficult to sell. Hence, the market for bank loans is
a customer market, in which borrowers and lenders are very imperfect substitutes. A credit
squeeze rations out  some bank  borrowers who may be unable to find loans elsewhere and
so be unable to finance their investment projects (Blinder and Stiglitz 1983, p. 300). Here,
therefore, the investment ratio is influenced by the change in total domestic credit scaled by
GNP  DDCY.
Most developing countries face an  upward-sloping supply curve of foreign saving Sfo,
as shown in  Figure 2.  This figure echoes Lloyd Metzler (1968) in viewing the current ac-
count deficit as the difference between domestic investment and  national saving.  It shows
the planned levels of national saving, foreign saving, and  domestic investment at different
levels of inflation-adjusted or real interest rates. The domestic investment function I  slopes
7The  variable REXL is divided  by 10 for scaling  purposes  in all the regression  estimates.12
Real  /Sf 1 Sn  Sn +  Sf 1 Rate
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Figure  2: National  Saving,  Domestic  Investment  and the Current  Account  Deficit.
downwards indicating that  there is more investment at lower interest rates.  The national
saving function Sn is nearly vertical indicating that  national saving does not  vary greatly
with changes in the domestic real interest rate.
The effective cost at which foreign saving hegins to be supplied in any particular year
depends on the country's  debt position inherited from past  borrowing. The effective cost
of foreign borrowing is also the effective  domestic real interest rate.  At an effective  interest
rate of ro, domestic investment I0 exceeds nat onal saving Sn%.  Hence, the inflow of foreign
saving is positive and the country runs a current account deficit on its balance of payments
equal to IO-Sno.
The accumulation of debt resulting from the current account deficit in year 0 raises the
foreign saving curve to Sfi.  T'his change produces an effective cost of foreign borrowing of
r1 in year 1. In this case, foreign debt accumulation reduces domestic investment and raises
national saving through a  higher domestic real interest  rate.  As this  process continues in
subsequent years, the current account deficit declines until it reaches a steady-state equilib-
rium in which the debt/C  NP ratio is constant. This is the stabilizing financial effect of foreign
debt accumulation.8
8The  destabilizing  effect of  foreign debt  accumulation  in  the  form  of  government  and  government-13
In a fuller study, the empirical work would  start with specification  searches for appropriate
functional forms for the behavioral equations in each individual co..ntry. Causality tests using
vector autoregression techniques would be performed and Chow tests conducted to detect
regime shifts. A fuller model would be developed to examine externalities, stock-flow  dynamiiic
relationships, and short- and long-run effects. Here, however I use pooled time-series analysis
to  present a picture of two representative developing economies, a  rapidly growing Pacific
Basin developing market economy and a normal developing country for comparison.
The regression method used here is iterative three-stage least squares which is, asymp-
totically, full-information maximum likelihood (Johnston 1984, pp. 486-492). I estimate the
16 individual country investment equations as a  system of equations with  cross-equation
equality restrictions on all coefficients  except the intercept.  Hence, the estimates apply to
a representative member of this sample of developing countries. 9 The estimation technique
corrects for heteroscedasticity across country equations and exploits contemporaneously cor-
related  disturbances.  The  instruments are the exogenous explanatory variables plus the
lagged FDI ratio, lagged domestic credit expansion divided by GNP, the lagged terms-of-trade
index in natural logarithms, lagged growth, the public sector borrowing requirement divided
by GNP,  the world real interest rate, oil price inflation, and the rate of growth (e .ntinuously
compounded) in OECD output.
The estimation period is  1966-1988 except for Brazil (1966-1985), Chile (1966-1984),
Indonesia (1967-1988), and Pakistan (1968-1988); there are therefore 353 observations. The
estimate  of this  investment function is (hats  denote endogenous variables, t statistics  are
given in parentheses):
1Y  =  - 0.347 FDIY  - 0.050FLYt.i  +  0.01ODDCY
(-2.313)  (-5.346)  (0.837)
(7)
- 0.229REXLt. 1 +  0.254YG  +  0.703IYt-i.
(-6.790)  (14.275)  (30.326)
R2 = 0.814
The key coefficient,  that  of the ratio of net FDI inflows to GNP FDIY, is significanitly  negative
for these developing countries as group. This finding is inconsistent with Turner's interpre-
tation  of the lack of correlation between FDI and the current account financing requirement.
In these countries,  FDI neither increases domestic investment nor does it provide additional
guaranteed foreign  debt is analyzed  in Fry  (1989, 1993).
9The relevant coefficients  in individual-country  estimates were predominantly  insignificant.14
balance-of-payments financing. These two negative findings are consistent with Dooley's as-
sertion that  financial flow variables have far too high degrees of substitutability  to provide
any useful analytical information.
Part  of the problem may lie in the imposition of coefficient  constraints across the entire
country sample.  Individual country estimates of the investment function indicate that  the
FDI coefficient is significant only in three countries. It is significantly negative in Chile but
significantly positive in Indonesia and Malaysia. This might suggest a strategy of splitting
the sample into one group of five Pacific Basin developing market economies and  another
control group of the  11 remaining countries.  The estimate  for the control group is (244
observations):
IY  =  -0.738  FDIY  - 0.022FLY,-,  + 0.013 DDCY
(-3.398)  (-1.738)  (0.658)
(8)
0.198RIXLt-I  +  0.219YG + 0.7531',_1.
(-3.651)  (6.803)  (21.093)
-2  =  0.781
The coefficients  are all very similar to those for the complete sample in equation 7.
In sharp  contrast,  however, the estimate for the five Pacific Basin developing market
economies is (114 observations):
1Y  =  0.853FDIY  - 0.040FLY._1 +  0.269DDCY
(2.983)  (-2.592)  (3.894)
(9)
+ 0.169REXLt-i  + 0.330YG +  0.6791Yt_l.
(1.212)  (4.853)  (12.766)
R2 = 0.866
In this  estimate,  the coefficient of  FDI is not  significantly different from 1.  This  implies
that  FDI may not be a close substitute for other forms of capital inflow in these economies.
Furthermore, it suggests that  FDI does not crowd out or substitute for domestically financed
investment. It is consistent with Turner's interpretation of the lack of correlation between FDI
and the current account financing requirement: FDI is autonomous and so increases domestic
investment.  It  cannot therefore provide additional financing for a pre-existing balance-of-
payments deficit.  Ceteris paribus, it increases the current account deficit by the magnitude
of the capital  inflow.  This conclusion that  FDI is not a close substitute  for other capital
inflows  in these Pacific Basin developing market economies corroborates the same conclusion15
by Pradumna  Rana  and  Malcolm  Dowling (1990, p. 92) for a similar  sample of Pacific Basin
developing  market  economies.
That  this  finding  for  the  Pacific  Basin  developing  market  economies  is not  universally
applicable  may well lie in the fact  that  a number  of Latin American  countries  have combined
debt-equity  swaps  with  programs  of  privatization.  In  these  cases,  the  deliberate  aim  of
attracting  FDI  is  not  to  increase  capital  formation  but  rather  to  substitute  one  form  of
capital  inflow for another.  The  recorded  net  FDI  inflow cancels  part  of the  country's  foreign
debt  and  is  used  to  acquire  holdings  in  the  newly  privatized  industries  such  as  Mexico's
Telecom.  While  this  process  of privatization  continues,  private  investors  may  take  a  wait-
and-see stance  before undertaking  new investment  projects.  Hence, the net inflow of FDI  may
be associated  with  a degree of uncertainty  that  clouds  the investment  outlook  ana  so reduces
capital  formation.  This  has  not happened  in the  Pacific Basin developing  market  economies.
4  Effects  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment  on  Saving,  Growth
and  the  Current  Account
4.1  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  National  Saving
The analysis of the effect of FDI  on investment is incomplete in that it ignores possible effects
of FDI  on national saving and on the rate of 
4z,  aomic growth. If FDI  affects national saving
directly or indirectly by influencing the rate of economic  growth, its impact on the current
account will not be identical to its impact on domestic investment. If FDI  affects the rate of
economic growth, it will also exert an indirect effect on domestic investment.  In this way,
FDI  could increase domestic investment by more than its own direct contribution.
Using a standard life-cycle  saving model, I estimate national saving as a ratio of GNP  SNY
for these 16 developing countries in the same way as the investment ratio (358 observations):
SNY  =  -0.650FDIY  - 0.021FLY.. 1 +  0.122RW  +  0.155YG  +  0.640SNYt 1. (10)
(-6.845)  (-3.651)  (3.509)  (8.420)  (21.251)
R2 =  0.858
The variable RW is the world real interest rate proxied here by the 6-month LIBOR  (London
Inter-Bank Offered Rate) dollar deposit rate  minus wholesale price inflation in the United
States (both  continuously compounded).  This saving function estimates indicates that  an
increase in FDI  reduces national saving. Since its negative effect on the national saving ratio
is larger than  its negative effect on the domestic investment ratio,  FDI  inflows to these 1616
developing countries have a direct negative impact on the current account.  About one third
of the  FDI inflow finances the increased current account deficit, while two thirds appears to
substitute  for alternative types of foreign capital inflows.' 0 Splitting the sample produces no
significant differences in the estimates; hence they are not reported here.
The negative effect of FDI on national saving ratios may be a statistical  artifact.  If some
rsidents  realize that terms and conditions for FDI are more favorable than they are for locally
financed investment, they have an incentive to remove capital from their country and to bring
it back again in the form of  FDI.  To the extent that  these individuals wish to conceal the
capital outflow, they will overinvoice  imports and underinvoice exports." 1 This method of
removing capital from a country reduces measured national saving, even if the true level of
saving remains constant, because saving is measured residually as investment plus the current
account (SNY  J  IY  + CAY, where CAY  is the current account divided by GNP).  In such
case, an increase in FDI would be accompanied by a reduction in recorded national saving.
4.2  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  the  Rate  of  Economic  Growth
Before the overall effect of FDI on the current account can be determined, the effect of FDI on
the rate  of economic growth has to be estimated because growth affects both the domestic
investment and national saving ratios. Jungsoo Lee, Pradumna Rana, and Yoshihiro  Iwasaki
(1986) estimate a simultaneous equation model of saving and growth for a sample of Asian
developing countries. Of the various capital inflow  components included in their growth rate
equation, FDI has the greatest positive impact. The authors also find that  FDI increases total
factor productivity. Ishrat  Husain and Kwang Jun (1992, p. 16) use a similar approach and
also detect a significantly positive effect of FDI on the rate of economic  growth for four ASEAN
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand).
My own estimate of the rate  of growth in real GNP  YG for the  16 sample developing
countries is (355 observations):
YG  =  0.1221Y - 0.022FDII  +  0.027XKG.  ()
(4.930)  (-0.544)  (2.397)
R2 = 0.181
'0The individual country estimates indicate that  FDI  inflows  have significant impacts in only two countries;
the coeffidents are negative and significant in Chile and Korea.
"An  exporter  submits  an  invoice for a  smaller sum  than  that  actually  received for the  exports  when
surrendering foreign exchange to the central bank; the difference  can then be deposited in the exporter's bank
account  abroad.  Conversely, an  importer  submits  an invoice for an  amount exceeding the  true _ost of the
imports in order to siphon the difference into his foreign bank account.17
The  variable  FDII  is the  ratio  of  FDI to domestic  investment  which  is substituted  for  FDIY
to  avoid  multicollinearity  with  IY  and  XKG  is the  rate  of growth  in  exports  at  constant
prices  (Feder  1982).  The  variable  IY  includes  both  domestically  financed  as well as foreign
direct  investment;  it  is aggregate  capital  formation  in  the  economy.  Hence,  the  insignifi-
cant  coefficient of FDII  indicates  that  FDI does not exert  a significantly  different effect from
domestically  financed  investment  on the  rate  of economic growth.
Splitting  the  country  sample  again,  the  estimate  for the  11-country control  group  is (241
observations):
YG  =  0.1991Y - 0.252FDII  +  0.015XKG.
(4.519)  (-3.917)  (0.804)
R2  =  0.104
A greater  ratio  of  FDI  in total  investment  reduces  ti.e rate  of economic  growth in the  control
group.  If FDI constitutes  a last-resort  source of external  financing  during  debt  and  balance-
of-payments  crises,  it may  well be associated  with  a reduction  in investment  productivity. 12
For the  five Pacific  Basin developing  market  economies,  the growth  function  estimate  is
(114 observations):
YG  =  0.1671Y  +  0.020FDFI  +  0.203XKG.  (13)
(9.655)  (0.351)  (7.034)
R2 =  0.167
As in the estimate  for the complete  sample,  the insignificant  coefficient of FDII indicates  that
FDI  does not exert  a significantly  different effect from domestically  financed investment  on the
rate  of economic  growth.  This  finding  is consistent  with  the  microeconomic  estimates  of the
effects of capital  formation  owned by foreign firms by  Brian Aitken  and  Ann  Harrison  (1992)
and  Mona  Haddad  and  Ann  Harrison  (1992),  in which  spillovers  from  FDI  to  domestically
financed  investment  in  the  same industries  are  not detected.
4.3  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  the  Current  Account
Since  FDI  affects  the  rate  of economic  growth  and  growth  affects  both  domestic  investment
and  national  sa.ving, FDI  exerts  both  direct  and  indirect  effects on  the current  account  as a
ratio  of GNP  CAY.  The simplest  way of determining  the  overall effect is to estimate  a  quasi-
" 2Elsewhere, I find that  investmenit productivity  deteriorates as a country  accumulates foreign debt  (Fry
1989).18
reduced  form  current  account  equation  for the  16 developing  countries  (358 observations):
CAY  =  -0.923FDIY  +  0.074FLYt-i  - 0.028DDCY  +  0.632CAYt-1. (14)
(-6.332)  (9.628)  (-2.632)  (19.090)
R2  =  0.721
The coefficient of FDIY  is not significantly  different from -1.  Since the direct  negative saving
effect  is  offset  to  some  extent  by  a  direct  negative  investment  effect,  FDIY  must  exert  a
substantial  negatiNe indirect  effect through  the rate  of economic  growth.
For the  11-country  control  group,  the  current  account  estimate  is (244 observations):
CAY  =  - 1.007FDIY  + 0.066FLY._.  + 0.01ODDCY  + 0.674CAYt- 1 . (15)
(-4.467)  (6.616)  (0.821)  (16.179)
R2  =  0.725
For  this  country  sample,  the  direct  effects of  FDIY  improve  the  current  account  because
domestic  investment  is reduced  more  than  national  saving  by an increase  in  FDI.  Hence,  the
negative  effect  of FDIY  on  the  current  account  implies  that  the  negative  indirect  effects of
FDI  easily  outweigh  the  positive  direct  effects.
Finally,  the  estimate  of the  current  account  ratio  for  the  five Pacific  Basin  developing
market  economies  is (114 observations):
CAY  =  -0.699FDIY  +  0.033FLYt-I  - 0.585DDCY  +  0.430CAYt-1.  (16)
(-1.984)  (2.243)  (-7.939)  (6.655)
R-2=  0.679
This  estimate  suggests  that  positive  indirect  effects through  growth  may offset  some of the
negative  direct  effects through  reduced  saving and  increased investment.  When the coefficient
of  FDIY  is not  constrained  to  be equal  across  the  five economies,  Malaysia's  coefficient  is
larger  than  -1  in absolute  magnitude  suggesting  that  in this  country  the  combined  negative
saving  and  investment  effects outweigh  the  positive  growth  rate  effect  of FDI  on  the  current
account.  13
The overall  conclusion  of this  section  is that  both  the  nature  and  the  effects of FDI  flows
vary significantly  between  different regions of the developing  world.  Outside  the Pacific Basin,
FDI  appears  to  have  beeni used in large  part  as a substitute  for other  types  of foreign flows.
131 provide  a more  detailed  analysis  of the  Malaysian  case  in (Fry  1992).19
When these countries attracted  more FDI inflows, national saving, domestic investment, and
the rate of economic  growth all declined; hence FDI appears to have been immiserizing.
In contrast,  the role of FDI  in the Pacific Basin developing market economies has been
benign. In these economies, FDI financial flows  have not been close substitutes for other types
of foreign capital flows. The insignificant  effect of the current account financing requirement
on FDI does indeed appear to indicate that  FDI is autonomous rather than accommodating; it
is matched by increased capital formation that is just  as productive as domestically financed
investment.
5  Incentive-Disincentive  Packages  for  Foreign  Direct
Investment  and  Other  Domestic  Distortions
So far, the analysis has detected differential effects of FDI on rates of economic  growth in two
distinct groups of developing countries. Hence, this section analyzes this differential effect in
more  detail.  As the  World  Bank (1991, p. 95) points  out:  " ...  direct  foreign investment  in
an economy with highly distorted policies is likely to generate net losses for the host country
instead of welfare gains."  Indeed, the theory of immiserizing growth might well apply most
forcefully in the case of FDI simply because FDI that produces negative value added at world
prices can be accompanied by the removal of resources in the form of repatriated profits.
This section presents a framework for examining the effects of distortions, including dis-
tortions created by the incentive-disincentive  package, in the economy  on the efficiency  of FDI.
It also suggests the possibility of some interaction between the incentive-disincentive  package
and  other distortions in  the economy on the efficiency  of  FDI.  The empirical illustration,
however, focuses solely on distortions in finance and trade, leaving empirical investigation of
the incentive-disincentive package and interaction between the size of such package and other
distortions on FDI efficiency  for another study.
Venkataraman Balasubramanyam (1984, pp. 732-733) concludes that  incentives for FDI
are generally  offered to offset  " ...  a complex web of controls  and  regulations."  Saul Lizondo
(1991, p. 79) also notes:  "Incentives are seldom granted  without conditions; instead, they
are usually subject to the compliance of requirements that constitute disincentives to foreign
direct investment."  One might therefore consider sets of incentive-disincentive  packages of
varying sizes and  complexity that  all attract  exactly the same quantity of  FD!.  In a  neo-
classical world, any package which maintains the quantity of FDI by offsetting constraints such
as local content requirements or ownership limitations with incentives such as tax holidays20





Figure  3:  Incentive-Disincentive  Packages  and Other Domestic  Distortions.
must  reduce the overall efficiency  of FDI.  This efficiency-reducing  effect is monotonic with
efficiency  declining as the size of the package increases, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 provides a  three-dimensional illustration  of the  possible interaction  between
package size and  other distortions in the  economy.  With no other  distortions, efficiency
declines monotonically as the package size is increased. In the other plane, efficiency  of FDI
also declines monotonically as other distortions in the economy increase. In the presence of
other distortions, however, a package of incentives and  disincentives towards FDI  could be
welfare improving, at least over some range. A rising segment of the plane showing  efficiency-
improving effects of increasing the package size when other distortions exist is also illustrated
in Figure 3.
There are several ways in which this interaction could occur. In a growth rate function,
FDIY would be included by itself and also interacted with indices measuring both the package
size P and the extent of other distortions D:
YG = f(FDJY,  P, D,  FDIY  - P, FDIY-D,  FDIY-P-D).  (17)
The same functional form could be used to estimate the magnitude of these interactive effects21
on  the  change  in total  factor  productiv:ty  A TFP:
ATFP = f(FDlY,  P, D, FDIY-P, FD1Y-D, FDIY-P-D).  (18)
This  is the  expression  illustrated  in  Figure  3 for a fixed value of FDIY.
The  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  some  distortions  can  reduce  investment  efficiency
quite  considerably.  Whether  or not  package size exerts  effects of similar  magnitudes  for any
given level of distortion  remains  to be tested.  Casual  observation  of differing policies towards
FDI  in the Pacific Basin developing  market  economies  might  suggest that  the distortion  slope
is considerably  steeper  than  the  package size slope.  However, as Hill (1990, p. 43) concludes:
" ...  the  central  issue  of whether  what  may  conveniently  be termed  the  'Singapore'  or the
'Korea'  strategy  is preferable,  from  either  host  or home country  perspective,  has  not  been
addressed  carefully  in the  literature."
In the  absence  of suitable  indicators  of incentive-disincentive  packages,"4 I illustrate  the
approach  with  indicators  of financial  and  trade  distortions,  the  real  deposit  rate  of interest
.and  the  black  market  foreign exchange  premium.  Both  these  variables  were extracted  from
the  World Development Report 1991: Supplementary Data diskettes.  As the World Bank
(1989,  pp.  29-31)  points  out:  "Historically,  the  quality  of investment  has  been  at  least  as
important  for growth as the quantity.  Although  the fastest-growing  countries  had higher rates
of investment  than  the others,  empirical  stud ios generally  find that  less than  half the growth
in output  is attributable  to increases  in labor  ani  -apital.  Higher productivity  explains  the
rest.  ...  Faster  growth,  more investment,  and  greater  financial  depth  all  come partly  from
higher  saving.  In its  own right,  however, greater  financial  depth  also contributes  to  growth
by improving  the  productivity  of investment."
One  way of analyzing  the efficiency-improving  role of financial  intermediation  starts  by
recognizing  the  fact  that  when  real  interest  rates  are  negative  there  is no incentive  to  use
capital  efficiently.  Excess capacity  is costless,  so plants  are  built with  far more capacity  than
required  for  immediate  production  plans.  Overtime,  shift  work,  and  other  measures  that
increase  the effective utilization  of plant  and  machinery  are not worthwhile  when keeping the
capital  stock idle is costless.  Under  such circumstances,  the  measured  capital  stock  exceeds
the  effective capital  stock.  For example,  the  effective capital  stock might  be equivalent  to 66
per  cent  of the  measured  capital  stock  wheii the  real interest  rate  is -15  per  cent.  However,
the  effective capital  stock might  equal  the  measured  capital  stock at  a  real interest  rate  of 5
"in  a fuller study, one might be able to use the seven  indicators  compiled  by the United Nations  Centre
on Transnational  Corporations  (1991)  or the index constructed  by Agarwal,  Gubitz, and Nunnenkamp  (1991,
pp. 35-36).22
per cent.  In this example, therefore, the effective  capital stock can be expressed as the actual
capital stock times (0.915 + 1.7r), where r is the real interest rate expressed in proportional
rather than percentage terms.
If financial intermediaries allocate investible funds more efficiently than other allocative
mechanisms, then  greater  financial depth caused by higher real deposit rates of interest
itself improves the quality of Anvestment.  To the extent that  FDI is combined with national
saving through joint participation or borrowing from the host country's financial institutions,
the efficiency of  FDI will be  negatively affected in the same way as domestically financed
investment by institutional  interest  rates that  are held below their free-market equilibrium
levels. Here, however, I estimate the specific impact of financial repression as measured by
the real deposit rate of interest R on Fri  efficiency  using a modified version of equation 19
for the 16-country sample (297 obser"ations):
YG  =  0.713FDIY  +  0.704 3 R  - 0.094(FD1Y *  R)  - 0.114 2(FDIY  R2)
(9.916)  (11.759)  (-13.786)  (-10.527)
+ 0.558- 5 (FDJ-Y  .R3)  +  0.055XKIG.  (19)
(10.779)  (10.382)
R2 =  0.198
The overall effect of a rising real interest rate on growth is illustrated in Figure 4.15 The
line Cn denotes two standard deviations below the mean of all negative interest rates in the
control group, P,, denotes two standard deviations below the mean of all negative interest
rates in the Pacific Basin economies, Pp denotes two standard  deviations above the mean
of all zero or positive interest  rates in the Pacific Basin economies, while Cp denotes two
standard deviations above the mean of all zero or positive interest rates in the control group
countries. Evidently, real interest rates deviated from their growth-maximizing  level far more
in the control group countries than they did in the Pacific Basin economies.
This result is comparable to other estimates of the effect of real interest rates of economic
growth.  For example, Jacques Polak (1989, pp. 66-70) reports econometric estimates for a
sample of 40 developing countries over the period 1965-1985  in which an increase in the real
interest rate of 10 percentage points raises the rate of economic growth by between 2 and 3
percentage points.  He concludes that a reduction in the real interest rate below its equilibrium
level by 1 percentage point requires an increase in the investment ratio by 1 percentage point
'5This  figure  is produced  using  the  mean  values of all the  explanatory  variables  with  the  exception  of the
real  deposit  rate  of interest.  The  mean  value of  the  real deposit  rate  is zero  with  a standard  deviation  of 23
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Figure  4:  Effect of Real  Interest  Rate  on Economic  Growth  Rote.
in order to maintain a fixed rate of economic growth. I find similar relationships in various
samples of Asian developing economies (Fry 1988, 1991).
Distortion in  foreign trade  has also received;  considerable amount  of attention.  In
relation  to  FDI,  Seiji Naya  (1990,  p.  298) points  out:  "  ...  the  immiserization  literature
is of great  significance because it illustrates how FDI and other capital flows can lead to
suboptimal  welfare levels, and even reduce welfare below pre-flow levels, when recipient
industries are  protected.  In short,  since protection will result in nonoptimal investment
decisions by foreign investors which in  turn  cause a  misallocation of resources, the level
of social welfare could easily be lower with foreign investment in a protected industry  than
without it."  The indicator used here is the black market foreign exchange premium B because
of its availability on an annual basis for all 16 sample countries (353 observations):
YG  =  0.276FD1Y  - 0.134-3(FD1Y  *  B2)  +  0.029XKG.  (20)
(1.954)  (-2.888)  (2.432)
R2 = 0.175
The effect of a rise in the black market foreign  exchange premium is illustrated in Figure 5.16
1 6The mean  value of the black market  exchange  rate premium  is 31 per cent with a standard deviation  of
63 per cent. Its minimum  value  is -10 and its maximum  value  is 639  per cent.24
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Figure  5:  Effect of Black  Market  Exchange  Rate  Premium  on Economic  Growth  Rate.
The line P  denotes two standard  deviations above the mean of all zero or  positive black
market exchange rate premia in the Pacific Basin economies, while C denotes two standard
deviations above thc  mean of all zero or  positive black market  exchange rate  premia in
the control group of countries.  Evidently, black market exchange rate  premia tended to be
considerabiy higher in the control group than they did in the Pacific Basin economies.
The superior efficiency  of FDI  in the Pacific Basin developing market economies reflects
not only less distorted  financial conditions than in other parts of the developing world but
also less distorted  trading systems. The outward orientation of the Pacific Basin developing
market  economies ensures that  relative prices cannot diverge too  far from world market
prices.  Under these conditions, there  are few possibilities for  FDI to  find high profits in
protected markets.  The favorable investment climates, however, ensure that  FDI flows  are
readily available without the need for governments to discriminate in favor of this particular
form of investment finance. 17 Hence, these economies have avoided the two major pitfalls of
FDI, namely, low or negative productivity caused by distortions in the economy and expensive
17The Maxwell Stamp report  (1991, p. 246) concludes that  general economic conditions can outweigh such
deficiencies as poor  accounting standards:  f  ...  toreign investors in Thailand  do not appear  to have been
discouraged by these factors."25
discriminatory  incentives  provided  in the  mistaken  belief that  FDI  brings externalities.
Morris  Goldstein,  Donald  Mathieson,  and  Timothy  Lane  (1991,  p.  43)  note  the  links
between  macroeconomic  policies that  promote  domestic  saving  and  capital  repatriation  on
the  one  hand  and  a  successful  experience  with  FDI  on  the  other  hand:  "At  a  minimum,
domestic  fiscal,  monetary,  exchange  rate,  and  financial  policies must  be designed  to  create
stable  domestic  economic  an financial market  conditions,  to provide  domestic  residents  with
clear incentives  to hold their savings in domestic  financial claims, and  to ensure  that  available
domestic  and  foreign  savings  are  used  to  support  productive  investment.  Stable  economic
conditions  are  also  important  for encouraging  foreign  direct  investment."  It  comes as  no
surprise,  therefore,  to  find  a  strong  positive  correlation  between  the  ratio  of domestically
financed  investment  to GNP  and  the  ratio  of FDI  and  GNP.
Indeed,  inflows of foreign direct  and  portfolio  investment  provide  good  indicators  of de-
velopment  performance  and  potential.  Policies aimed  directly  at  stimulating  these  forms of
capital  inflows  appear  to  be  ineffective or  to  produce  the  opposite  effects  to  those  desired.
The  evidence  suggests  overwhelmingly  that  policies that  promote  domestic  investment  and
growth are most  likely to stimulate  private  sector capital  inflows in all forms.  In summarizing
findings similar  to those of Balasubramanyam  (1984), Jamuna  Agarwal,  Andrea  Gubitz,  and
Peter  Nunnenkamp  (1991, p.  128) conclude:
...  the  effectiveness of tax  and  tariff exenip ions as well as related  privileges for FDI,
some of which are very costly for the host countries, is uncertain  at  best.  They  may
even result in a vicious circle if privileges granted to foreign investors give rise to hostile
feelings against  FDI  in the  recipient countries.  The  consequences  may be a  new wave
of regulations, intensified efforts to circumvent the restrictions, and finally the retreat of
foreign investors. It appears more promising  to adhere to the rule: "what is good policy for
domestic investors is also good for foreign investors", by creating a stable and favourable
general framework for investmert.  Ad hoc interventions should be kept to the minimum.
It  is not only the  rules and  regulations that  matter,  but also how they are applied in
practice. The approval procedure should be fast and transparent as it is a crucial element
in the investment decision of foreign companies.
The  evidence  presented  in  this  section  is certainly  consistent  with  this  conclusion.
6  Conclusion
By  analyzing  FDI  in  a  macroeconomic  framework,  this  paper  throws  new light  on  various
channels  through  which  FDI  can  influence  saving,  investment,  growth,  and  the  balance  of26
payments on current account.  The first finding is tha;  in a sample of 16 developing coun-
tries, FDI does not provide additional balance-of-payments  financing for a pre-existing current
account deficit. In the 11 developing countries constituting a control group, FDI iS associated
with reduced domestic investment, so implying that  FDI to these countries is simply a close
substitute  for other capital inflows. For five Pacific Basin developing market economies,  how-
ever, FDI  raises domestic investment by the full extent of the FDI inflow. In these countries,
therefore, FDI lau nob been used as a substitute  for other types of capital inflows but  has
increased capital formation and so worsened the current account.
In examining some secondary effects, J find that  FDI has a significantly negative impact
on national saving in this sample of developing  countries. For the control group, this negative
effect is of similar magnitude to the negative effect of FDI on domestic investment, implying
a zero effect on the current account.  However,  the negative effect of FDI  on national saving
in the five Pacific Basin developing market economies implies that  FDI could have a negative
effect on the  current  account  in excess of its  negative effect through  increased domestic
investment.
I also find distinctive differences  in the effects of FDI on economic growth in the control
group and the Pacific Basin developing market economies. While FDI has a negative effect on
growth in the first country group, it has the same positive effect on growth as domestically
financed investment in the latter country group.
Finally, I show that in the 16 sample developing countries taken together FDI  raises the
rate of economic growth in the absence of financial repression and trade distortions. However,
financial repression as measured by the real deposit rate of interest and trade distortions as
measured by the black market exchange rate premium can both cause rDi to be immiserizing.27
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